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THE SUPREME COURT’S SURPRISING AND 
STRATEGIC RESPONSE TO THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991 
Michael Selmi* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 (“CRA”) sought to change the 
employment discrimination landscape.  The CRA overturned or 
repudiated eight Supreme Court decisions that had narrowed the 
scope of Title VII in a way that Congress determined was 
inconsistent with the broad purpose of eradicating employment 
discrimination.1  Relatedly, the CRA transformed Title VII from an 
equitable relief statute—under which attorneys were most 
commonly compensated through attorney fee petitions—to a tort-
like statute that allows for jury trials and damages for claims 
relating to intentional discrimination.  The CRA also marked the 
most comprehensive amendment to the original Civil Rights Act; 
although Title VII had been amended several times previously, the 
CRA was, by far, the most substantial amendment then or now.2 
 
 * Samuel Tyler Research Professor of Law, George Washington 
University Law School.  An earlier version of this Article was presented at a 
Symposium held at Wake Forest University School of Law, where I benefitted 
from the comments and conversations I had at the time.  Particular thanks to 
Professor Wendy Parker for the invitation to participate and for very helpful 
suggestions. 
 1. The statute overturned portions of or the entire decisions in eight cases.  
See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (extraterritorial 
application of Title VII), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 
No. 102-166, § 109, 105 Stat. 1071, 1077; W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 
U.S. 83 (1991) (expert witness fees), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 
1991 § 113; Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (§ 1981), 
superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 101(b); Lorance v. AT&T 
Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989) (seniority system), superseded by statute, Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 § 112; Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (white employees 
allowed to challenge affirmative action consent decrees), superseded by statute, 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 108; Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 
(1989) (disparate impact), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105; 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (mixed motives), superseded 
by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(a); Library of Cong. v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 
310 (1986) (government’s immunity from interest), superseded by statute, Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 § 114. 
 2. Prior to the passage of the CRA, Title VII had been amended twice.  In 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1832753
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In this Article, I will explore the effect the CRA has had on 
employment discrimination litigation, primarily in the Supreme 
Court, but I will also glance toward litigation in the lower courts.  
Based on a review of the Title VII cases and other related cases the 
Court has decided over the last twenty years,3 it appears that the 
CRA had a meaningful restraining effect on the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence.  Since the CRA was passed, the Court has generally, 
though by no means always, been more supportive of plaintiffs’ Title 
VII claims than it had been in the years immediately preceding the 
CRA.  There is, however, an important caveat: in the most 
ideological cases, or those cases that might have the most dramatic 
effect on litigation, the Court has remained decidedly pro-defendant.  
In other words, in the most meaningful cases, plaintiffs continue to 
encounter a hostile Supreme Court.  It also appears that the 
changes wrought by the CRA did not substantially improve 
outcomes for plaintiffs, though there was, especially in the early 
years, a dramatic increase in filings.  On the whole, plaintiffs have 
fared only marginally better on the merits, and employment 
discrimination cases continue to be more difficult to win than most 
other comparable civil cases. 
This Article will proceed in two primary parts.  The first Part 
will explore the cases that preceded the CRA and introduce the 
positive political theory framework through which I want to analyze 
the Court’s response.  Positive political theory sees the relationship 
between the judicial, legislative, and executive branches as a 
political game designed to assert preferences; several scholars have 
assessed the origins of the CRA against the positive political theory 
framework.4  The second Part of the Article will go beyond those 
 
1972, Title VII was amended to apply the statute to public employers (and to 
address other smaller issues), and in 1978, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
was passed to amend Title VII so that discrimination based on pregnancy would 
be considered part of sex discrimination.  See ROY L. BROOKS ET AL., CIVIL 
RIGHTS LITIGATION 402–03 (3d ed. 2005). 
 3. In this Article, I am concentrating on Title VII, the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and § 1981, while consciously excluding cases 
involving the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).  The ADA was passed in 
1990 and the Supreme Court has generally interpreted it very narrowly—so 
narrowly, in fact, that Congress recently passed a statute to modify several of 
the decisions.  See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 
Stat. 3553 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).  The 1991 
Act, however, was not aimed at the ADA, and the ADA also posed unusual 
interpretive issues that may have led the Court to effectively rewrite the 
statute.  Most of what proved to be controversial decisions were not ideologically 
charged, as several of the cases were decided by seven-to-two margins.  For a 
discussion of the ADA and the Court’s interpretive approach, see Michael Selmi, 
Interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act: Why the Supreme Court 
Rewrote the Statute, and Why Congress Did Not Care, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
522 (2008).  Obviously, the article’s title proved a bit too cute. 
 4. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory 
Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 385–90 (1991); William N. 
W07_SELMI 4/15/2011  11:24:08 AM 
 
analyses to assess the Supreme Court’s response to see how the 
Court has adopted a strategically sophisticated approach that has 
diverged significantly from its interpretative path prior to the CRA. 
I. THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991 
The history behind the CRA is well known and I will provide 
only a cursory outline, some of which is informed by my experiences 
as a staff attorney with the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights at 
the time the Act was under consideration.  Although I played a 
rather minor monitoring role, the Lawyers’ Committee and my 
direct supervisor, Rick Seymour, were heavily involved in the 
drafting and negotiating of the legislation, and I later became 
enmeshed in some of the early litigation interpreting the CRA. 
During the 1980s, the Supreme Court took a deeply 
conservative turn on issues of civil rights, particularly with respect 
to employment discrimination.  The Court repeatedly reached 
adverse results for plaintiffs, and even in cases in which the 
plaintiffs prevailed, the Court would often impose significant 
limitations on the employment discrimination doctrine.5  There were 
a substantial number of cases that limited the rights of plaintiffs, 
but three cases decided during the 1989 term were particularly 
important in prompting congressional action. 
Probably the most significant departure from prior precedent 
came in the case of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, in which the 
Court severely restricted the scope of § 1981.6  The statute had never 
been a major source of employment rights, but it was one of the 
original civil rights statutes enacted during Reconstruction, and it 
had a long history that the Supreme Court effectively ignored in 
holding that the statute only applied to contract formation, and not 
to acts of discrimination that occurred thereafter.7  Not only did the 
Court limit the statute’s reach, it did so aggressively and on its own 
initiative.  After the case was initially briefed and argued on the 
question of the statute’s scope, the Court, on its own motion, called 
for reargument on whether the statute should apply to private 
parties, an issue the Supreme Court had addressed in Runyon v. 
McCrary8 just a decade earlier and that the parties had not raised.9  
 
Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History?  Playing the Court/Congress/President 
Civil Rights Game, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 613, 615–16 (1991). 
 5. A case that perhaps fits this mold best was Watson v. Fort Worth Bank 
& Trust, in which the Court held that subjective employment practices could be 
challenged under a disparate impact theory but also began to carve out a more 
rigorous proof structure for those claims.  Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 
487 U.S. 977, 999–1000 (1988).  This project gained a critical fifth vote three 
years later in Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 660. 
 6. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 164. 
 7. See id. 
 8. 427 U.S. 160, 168 (1976). 
 9. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 190–91 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment 
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Ultimately, the Court backed away from that radical 
reinterpretation, in part because of an outpouring of briefs and 
critical public reaction,10 but the Court’s gesture, and its limitation 
of the statutory scope, sent a signal that settled civil rights 
principles were up for reconsideration. 
During the same term, the Court also rewrote the law with 
respect to class action settlements.  In Martin v. Wilks, a group of 
white firefighters sought to intervene in a case that had been 
resolved through a consent decree many years earlier.11  The white 
firefighters sought to challenge the remedial provisions in the 
decree, which they argued impermissibly limited their opportunities 
within the fire department; by a five-to-four vote, the Court 
permitted the intervention, even though the firefighters had the 
opportunity to contest the decree when it was originally entered.12  
This meant that, despite the Court’s frequent admonitions regarding 
the importance of finality in litigation, it would often be difficult to 
determine when a settlement embodied in a consent decree could be 
assumed to be final and free from challenge.  It also meant that a 
new group of firefighters could challenge settlements that their 
predecessors had accepted.13 
The Wilks case also offers important context for understanding 
the Court’s direction during this time period.  The consent decree at 
issue in Wilks provided for preferential treatment of African 
American firefighters as part of the remedies that had been 
incorporated into the decree.14  The case therefore became part of the 
affirmative action debate that was raging throughout much of the 
 
in part and dissenting in part).  For a discussion of the controversy surrounding 
Patterson, see Donald R. Livingston & Samuel A. Marcosson, The Court at the 
Crossroads: Runyon, Section 1981, and the Meaning of Precedent, 37 EMORY L.J. 
949 (1988).  To offer a flavor of what was at stake, the authors explain: 
The NAACP Legal Defense Fund sought and obtained participation as 
amicus curiae by 47 of the 50 states, the American Bar Association, 
and a bipartisan group of 66 Senators and 119 Representatives.  It 
sought also the participation of the executive branch as amicus, but 
the administration decided not to participate. 
Id. at 952 n.18; see also Al Kamen, Administration Won’t Argue Rights Case: 
Solicitor General Upsets Conservatives, WASH. POST, June 24, 1988, at A1.  “The 
Government had filed a brief on Patterson’s behalf on initial argument which 
had assumed the validity of Runyon’s interpretation of § 1981, and, given that 
premise, had supported Patterson’s position that racial harassment could give 
rise to a valid § 1981 claim against a private employer.”  Livingston & 
Marcosson, supra, at 952 n.18. 
 10. For a discussion of the case and the public reaction, see John Hope 
Franklin, The Civil Rights Act of 1866 Revisited, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1135 (1990). 
 11. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 758–59 (1989), superseded by statute, 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 108, 105 Stat. 1071, 1076–77. 
 12. Id. at 758, 761–63. 
 13. For a critical analysis of the case, see George M. Strickler, Jr., Martin v. 
Wilks, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1557 (1990). 
 14. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 758. 
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1980s, and was seen as integral to the Reagan administration’s 
broader assault on civil rights and affirmative action.15  Even though 
the administration had been unsuccessful in many of the cases,16 the 
Wilks case was seen as giving a green light to efforts to dismantle 
remedial orders.17  From this perspective, the Court’s decision was 
fully consistent with the position espoused by the Reagan 
administration—and to a lesser extent by the Bush 
administration—and the Democratic Congress became concerned 
with what the future might hold.18 
While Wilks and Patterson reflected the Court’s hostility toward 
employment discrimination claims, the coup de grâce came with the 
Court’s decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, a complicated 
case in which the Court rewrote part of the disparate impact law to 
place the burden of proof of the business-necessity defense squarely 
on the plaintiffs.19  Although the Court’s decision was seen as a 
significant change in the law, it had also become clear that a 
majority was developing on the Court in favor of eliminating the 
disparate impact theory altogether—a theory the Court had created 
in common law fashion in its landmark Griggs decision.20  Like 
Wilks, Wards Cove was also seen as indirectly connected with the 
affirmative action debate, given that the disparate impact theory 
 
 15. For an excellent discussion of the efforts of the Reagan and Bush 
administrations to dismantle affirmative action and to challenge other civil 
rights orthodoxies, see Neal Devins, Reagan Redux: Civil Rights Under Bush, 
68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955 (1992). 
 16. On two previous occasions, the Reagan administration’s efforts to 
challenge existing decrees had been rebuffed.  See Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of 
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 530 (1986); Firefighters Local 
Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 583 (1984). 
 17. A similar phenomenon was occurring with school desegregation decrees 
as the Supreme Court was loosening the standards for dismantling those 
decrees.  The most significant case was decided while the CRA was under 
consideration.  See Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247 (1991) 
(establishing the standard for dissolving a desegregation decree); cf. Missouri v. 
Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 50 (1990) (rejecting the district court’s assertion of power 
to raise taxes to fund plan implementation). 
 18. Prior to the 1988 term, the Court had vacillated some.  For example, it 
approved the use of preferential hiring in a gender discrimination case, Johnson 
v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), and upheld a remedial 
affirmative action order in United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987), while 
invalidating a preferential layoff policy in Wygant v. Jackson Board of 
Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
 19. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 660 (1989), superseded 
by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 
1074. 
 20. The Griggs decision, recognizing what has come to be known as the 
disparate impact theory, was not tethered to any particular statutory language 
but was entirely a product of statutory interpretation.  See Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971).  The notion that the Supreme Court 
was likely to eviscerate the disparate impact theory is based, in large part, on 
the author’s recollections of the negotiations surrounding the CRA. 
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had often, and mistakenly, been seen as prompting employers to 
adopt quotas as a way of avoiding litigation.21  The Wards Cove case 
was decided on the last day of the same term that produced the 
Wilks and Patterson decisions; shortly after the term ended, 
Congress began work on what was then dubbed the Civil Rights Act 
of 1990.22 
While the three cases discussed above played the strongest role 
in motivating Congress to act, the Court issued a number of other 
controversial decisions on smaller issues, all of which made it more 
difficult for discrimination plaintiffs to obtain relief on their claims.  
Some of the issues involved interest on judgments and awards of 
expert fees,23 while others involved the timing of claims24 or the 
extraterritorial application of Title VII.25  Together these cases 
represented a clear hostility to the interests of plaintiffs—a hostility 
that became particularly apparent when seen in connection with a 
series of nonemployment discrimination cases decided at the same 
time that reflected a broader hostility to civil rights claims, 
particularly in the area of affirmative action.26  When we turn to an 
 
 21. The Court has explicitly made this connection.  See Wards Cove, 490 
U.S. at 653; Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 992 (1988).  For 
a discussion regarding how affirmative action is frequently linked with 
disparate impact claims, see Mary C. Daly, Affirmative Action, Equal Access 
and the Supreme Court’s 1988 Term: The Rehnquist Court Takes a Sharp Turn 
to the Right, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1057, 1080–81 (1990). 
 22. See Susan F. Rasky, Rights Groups Work on Measure to Reverse Court’s 
Bias Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1989, at 11. 
 23. See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S 83, 84 (1991) 
(restricting expert witness fees), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991 
§ 113; Library of Cong. v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 311 (1986), superseded by statute, 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 114. 
 24. Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 911–12 (1989) (holding that 
a seniority system could be challenged as discriminatory only when it was first 
adopted rather than when it became applicable), superseded by statute, Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 § 112. 
 25. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 246 (1991), superseded by 
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 109. 
 26. In the same term as Wilks, Patterson, and Wards Cove, the Supreme 
Court applied strict scrutiny to review and strike down a set-aside program in 
the city of Richmond, the former capital of the Confederacy.  See City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493, 511 (1989).  That same term, in 
a rather extraordinary showing, the Court decided five other notable cases, all 
of which went against the plaintiffs.  See Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 
492 U.S. 158, 168–69 (1989) (holding that a disability plan adopted prior to 
passage of the ADEA could not be considered a subterfuge for discrimination); 
Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 766 (1989) (holding 
that no attorneys’ fees would be granted against losing intervenors); Jett v. 
Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 731 (1989) (holding that § 1983 provided 
the exclusive remedy for rights violations by state governmental actors); Will v. 
Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that the State is not 
a person under § 1983); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 
U.S. 189, 202 (1989) (finding the State not liable under § 1983 for failing to 
protect a child from abuse). 
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assessment of the effects of the CRA, it is important to keep these 
smaller cases in mind, as in the 1980s no case seemed too small for 
the Court to side with employers. 
Once the legislation began to move through Congress, several 
obstacles became apparent.  With President George H.W. Bush in 
office, the Democratically controlled Senate had to secure the votes 
necessary to overcome a presidential veto.  Many of the proposed 
provisions were uncontroversial, and there was also widespread 
agreement that Title VII plaintiffs should be afforded jury trials 
with damages available.27  At the same time, a group of Republican 
Senators were intent on making the bill part of a larger tort-reform 
effort and therefore sought to place caps on the damages 
provisions.28  Among some in Congress, there was a sense that 
capping the damages in Title VII cases would lead to damage caps in 
other federal statutes, although efforts to impose broader tort 
reform stalled shortly after the passage of the CRA.29 
The most controversial part of the legislation was the provision 
designed to overturn the Wards Cove decision.  As I have argued 
elsewhere, the disparate impact theory has always rested uneasily 
within antidiscrimination law and it has likewise always been 
equated with affirmative action, an issue that was particularly 
divisive at the time.30  The Supreme Court, and politicians, had 
cautioned against aggressive interpretations of the disparate impact 
law for fear that employers would be forced to adopt quotas as a way 
to avoid lawsuits.31  This always seemed mostly a specious argument 
given that the disparate impact theory had been in existence since 
1971, with reasonably aggressive interpretations in the 1970s, 
without any hint of broadscale quota-motivated hiring.32  In any 
event, the rhetoric proved powerful and the disparate impact 
provisions became hotly contested and produced a series of 
innovative legislative provisions. 
Within the Senate, a debate broke out regarding whether Wards 
 
 27. M. Isabel Medina, A Matter of Fact: Hostile Environments and 
Summary Judgments, 8 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 311, 325 (1999). 
 28. In an op-ed defending the President’s signing of the bill, White House 
Counsel C. Boyden Gray made the connection explicit.  See C. Boyden Gray, 
Civil Rights: We Won, They Capitulated, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 1991, at A23 
(noting that the damages provisions in the CRA [set] “an important precedent 
for tort reform”). 
 29. 137 CONG. REC. 30,693 (Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. Chester 
Atkins). 
 30. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 
UCLA L. REV. 701, 706, 763–67 (2006). 
 31. Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Q-Word as Red Herring: Why 
Disparate Impact Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 TEX. L. REV. 
1487, 1489–90 (1996); see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 
977, 993 (1988); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 449 (1975). 
 32. For a strong refutation of the argument, see generally Ayres & 
Siegelman, supra note 31. 
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Cove was truly a departure from past precedent, eventually leading 
to dueling legislative memoranda that were written primarily by 
interest groups.33  At least in this particular instance, Justice 
Scalia’s theory of statutory interpretation was given full credence, as 
the memoranda were naked attempts to influence how the statute 
should be interpreted almost entirely independent of the legislators 
themselves, though not independent of their staffs, which had been 
deeply involved in the process.34  As a result, the Senate inserted a 
most peculiar provision into the statute forbidding courts from 
looking to the legislative history.35  The Wards Cove company also 
got its hands in the legislative cookie jar, as it was worried that the 
legislative fix might undo its ten-year victory, and the company 
eventually purchased its own statutory provision that exempted the 
Wards Cove case from the legislation.36 
Despite all of the legislative maneuvering, the controversy 
refused to die, and President Bush vetoed the Civil Rights Act of 
1990 due to the disparate impact provision.37  Congress failed in its 
override attempt but immediately set out to craft a new bill, 
although the prospects for passage remained dim until the Clarence 
Thomas hearings intervened.38  While Congress was debating what 
was then known as the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Anita Hill’s 
allegations of sexual harassment surfaced, which led to a public 
debate over the emerging sexual harassment doctrine.  Those 
 
 33. See Nathan Oman, Statutory Interpretation in Econotopia, 25 PACE L. 
REV. 49, 68 (2004). 
 34. See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative 
Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 289 & n.39 (1989); Oman, supra note 33, at 68. 
 35. Section 105(b) of the CRA reads: 
No statements other than the interpretive memorandum appearing at 
Vol. 137 Congressional Record S 15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) shall 
be considered legislative history of, or relied upon in any way as 
legislative history in construing or applying, any provision of this Act 
that relates to Wards Cove—Business necessity/cumulation 
/alternative business practice. 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006)). 
 36. The very last provision of the Act, section 402(b), states: “Certain 
Disparate Impact Cases.—Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, 
nothing in this Act shall apply to any disparate impact case for which a 
complaint was filed before March 1, 1975, and for which an initial decision was 
rendered after October 30, 1983.”  Id. § 402(b).  It was generally understood 
that the Wards Cove case was the only case that satisfied this definition.  See 
Stewart Kwoh, Congress Votes a Cure for All but the Victims, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 
19, 1991, at B37 (noting that the company paid lobbyists more than $175,000 to 
secure the unusual provision). 
 37. See Steven A. Holmes, President Vetoes Bill on Job Rights; Showdown 
Is Set, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1990, at A1. 
 38. Initial efforts to override the veto failed by one vote in the Senate.  See 
Neil A. Lewis, President’s Veto of Rights Measure Survives by 1 Vote, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 25, 1990, at A1.  A new bill was later introduced with some 
modifications. 
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hearings ultimately contributed to the passage of the CRA; indeed, I 
think it is fair to say that without the hearings, there may not have 
been a CRA.39  There were two reasons for this connection.  First, 
Missouri Senator John Danforth was both a Republican sponsor of 
the CRA and the shepherd for Clarence Thomas, who had worked 
for the Senator many years earlier in the Missouri Attorney 
General’s office.40  After the Anita Hill allegations arose, Senator 
Danforth pledged to ensure Thomas’s nomination and the passage of 
the CRA—a pledge he ultimately lived up to.41 
Second, and sometimes lost in the story, was the realization 
during the hearings that victims of sexual harassment were often 
left without any meaningful remedy.  Not only did civil rights 
advocates have Justice Thomas to thank for the passage of the CRA, 
Judge Daniel Manion from the Seventh Circuit also chipped in with 
his own contribution.42  In a case involving clear and uncontested 
sexual harassment, Diane Swanson had been denied any relief since 
she did not lose her job and therefore did not suffer monetary loss.43  
Not content to simply deny her relief, the Seventh Circuit went on to 
conclude that because she was not eligible for any relief, she had no 
claim and therefore was responsible for the defendant’s court costs, 
which were taken directly out of her paycheck.44 
As noted at the outset, the CRA overturned parts or all of eight 
Supreme Court decisions, and it added important new remedial 
provisions to the statute.45  Equally important, the CRA sent a 
strong signal that Congress believed the Court was interpreting 
Title VII too narrowly, and there was language to this effect 
included in the statutory preface.46  The debate over the Act occurred 
in a very public forum over the course of two years and tainted the 
arrival of the Court’s newest member.  All of this is to suggest that it 
 
 39. Other scholars have reached the same conclusion.  See, e.g., Jerome 
McCristal Culp, Jr., Neutrality, the Race Question, and the 1991 Civil Rights 
Act: The “Impossibility” of Permanent Reform, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 965, 965 
(1993) (giving primacy to the role of the Thomas hearings in the passage of the 
CRA); Devins, supra note 15, at 996 (emphasizing the importance of the 
Thomas hearings and of David Duke’s run for governor of Louisiana to the 
passage of the CRA). 
 40. See Linda P. Campbell, GOP’s Danforth Faces a Political Maelstrom: 
Senator Must Play 2 Roles with Bush, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 1, 1991, § 1, at 19. 
 41. See Helen Dewar, White House, Senate Agree on Civil Rights Bill 
Revisions, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1991, at A1, A8. 
 42. See Swanson v. Elmhurst Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 882 F.2d 1235, 1240 
(7th Cir. 1989) (quoting Bohen v. City of E. Chi., 799 F.2d 1180, 1184 (7th Cir. 
1986) (“If Congress wishes to amend the provisions of Title VII to provide a 
remedy of damages, it can do so.”)). 
 43. Id. 
 44. See Judith Lichtman, The Labor Force Needs the 1990 Civil Rights Act, 
NEWSDAY (N.Y.), May 31, 1990, at 69. 
 45. See supra note 1. 
 46. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(4), 105 Stat. 1071, 
1071. 
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would have been difficult for the Supreme Court to ignore the 
message behind the CRA, but it was less clear whether the Act 
would have its intended effect.  Some of the provisions were 
effectively self-executing: the interest and attorney’s fees provisions 
allowed for little judicial interpretation, and the provision designed 
to overturn Martin v. Wilks also turned out to be a clear directive 
that produced no meaningful subsequent litigation.  But the real 
question was whether the Supreme Court would take Congress’s 
broader message seriously and interpret Title VII with an eye 
toward fulfilling the underlying purpose of the CRA rather than 
with an eye toward protecting employers. 
The message sent by—as opposed to the substantive provisions 
of—the 1991 Act raises important questions about the relationship 
between Congress and the Court.  Here Congress was not only 
reversing specific decisions but was also seeking to change the 
Court’s interpretive direction.  Congress’s oversight powers, 
however, are limited; Congress could always pass new legislation to 
change or modify Supreme Court decisions, but short of new 
legislation the Court is largely free to ignore congressional 
directives.  Suggesting that the Court is free to ignore congressional 
directives assumes that the Court may have its own interests or 
preferences in mind in interpreting statutes.  Most scholars who 
concentrate on statutory interpretation assume that a court’s 
judicial duty is to interpret the statute consistent with congressional 
intent, with the primary area of contention being what Congress 
intended.47  Positive political theorists, on the other hand, treat 
courts as political actors who desire to implement their own 
preferences; these theorists typically see modes of statutory 
interpretation as rhetorical, rather than restraining.48  Numerous 
empirical scholars have also documented that courts frequently 
decide cases based on judges’ presumed ideological preferences.49  
 
 47. See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (2006); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalism of 
Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 117 (2009); Lawrence M. Solan, Private 
Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of Legislative Intent in Statutory 
Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427 (2005). 
 48. The literature on positive political theory is now extensive, but a good 
summary can be found in McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory 
of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631 (1995).  For a 
recent literature review, see Michael Abramowicz & Emerson H. Tiller, Citation 
to Legislative History: Empirical Evidence on Positive Political and Contextual 
Theories of Judicial Decisionmaking, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 419 (2009). 
 49. There is now an extensive empirical literature on judicial decisions, 
most of which reveals that judges’ political ideology has a statistically 
significant effect on their decisions.  It is generally the case that political 
ideology is not determinative in most cases but is clearly significant.  For 
several recent discussions of the literature, and some critiques, see CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? (2006); William M. Landes & Richard 
A. Posner, Rational Behavior: A Statistical Study, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 775 
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For a conservative court, when it comes to issues of employment 
discrimination, those preferences are most likely to include 
insulating employers from liability, and as we have just seen, that 
was how the pre-CRA Court proceeded. 
Yet the Court was ultimately unsuccessful, and within the 
positive political theory framework, a court that wants to implement 
its preferences must avoid having its decisions overturned.  As a 
strategic matter, this can lead to some complex analysis, as the 
Supreme Court would be primarily concerned not with the Congress 
that enacted a statute but with the current Congress that would be 
responsible for passing any new legislation, and, similarly, with the 
President who might veto the legislation.50  Under this guise, the 
Court clearly played the game poorly in its discrimination decisions 
of the late 1980s, since those decisions all had a very short shelf life.  
In light of the CRA’s repudiation of those decisions, we might expect 
the Supreme Court to change its game plan.  As we will see, that is 
precisely what it did—and it did so in a strategic way that has 
protected most of the decisions the Court seems to care most about. 
II. THE POST-1991 ACT CASES 
This Part will assess the Supreme Court’s behavior following 
the passage of the CRA in 1991 and will demonstrate that the Court 
has acted as positive political theory would predict.  Apparently 
chastened by the CRA rebuke, the Court has proceeded more wisely, 
ruling for plaintiffs in the majority of cases, often unanimously, 
while siding with the interests of employers in the cases that matter 
most.  During this time period, from 1993 to 2009, the Court’s 
composition has changed but it has remained a fundamentally 
conservative Court, one that arguably is more conservative than the 
Court that issued the decisions that led to the CRA.51  It is 
 
(2009); and Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: 
Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court 
Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150 (2004).  Although the empirical 
approach has now migrated to law schools, much of the work is concentrated in 
political science.  For a work coauthored by a leading contributor in the field, 
see JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993). 
 50. See John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast, A Positive Theory of 
Statutory Interpretation, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 263, 270 (1992) (noting that 
“the preference configuration of the current legislature is far more important for 
the results of statutory interpretation than is that of the enacting legislature”). 
 51. Justice Alito is more conservative than the Justice he replaced—Justice 
O’Connor—and this is particularly true on employment discrimination issues.  
Chief Justice Roberts is also more conservative than was Chief Justice 
Rehnquist.  Perhaps most significantly, Justice Clarence Thomas, who joined 
the Court in 1991, is undeniably far more conservative than Justice Thurgood 
Marshall.  Justice Kennedy, who joined the Court in 1988, has also solidified his 
foothold in the conservative wing of the Court on many issues.  On the other 
side, Justice Ginsburg is more liberal than the Justice she replaced—Justice 
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important, however, to highlight the Court’s process—many of the 
cases the Court has adjudicated over the last two decades have 
raised rather minor issues, and a surprising number of cases were 
simply necessary to reverse plainly incorrect lower court cases.  In 
these minor cases, the plaintiffs have uniformly prevailed.  But 
there were also a handful of controversial and important cases, and 
in those cases the defendants have prevailed, suggesting that the 
Court was still willing to implement its preferences, at the risk of 
reversal, in the cases of greatest significance.  Finally, there were 
cases addressing issues of intermediate importance in which the 
plaintiffs fared well, and it is in this handful of cases that the Court 
likely exercised the most judicial restraint. 
Before discussing the cases, I must address several preliminary 
matters.  As noted previously, I have excluded disability cases from 
the analysis, primarily because the CRA was not aimed at the 
disability statute.  The Court unquestionably interpreted the ADA 
narrowly, and Congress recently passed legislation intended to 
modify the Court’s approach in several of the cases;52 it will be 
interesting to see how the Court responds, and if the CRA offers any 
guidance to the Court’s likely reaction to the statutory repudiation.  
I have also excluded most of the cases that involve arbitration 
agreements since the cases have primarily involved interpretation of 
a different statute—the Federal Arbitration Act53—or issues not 
directly related to discrimination claims.54  I have, however, included 
the several cases that directly involve discrimination issues.  
Finally, I should note that classifying several of the cases has 
required subjective determinations as to who prevailed in a case, 
and also as to whom the doctrine is most likely to benefit.  I will 
highlight where I have made such judgments. 
Immediately following the passage of the CRA, the Supreme 
Court appeared to be up to its old tricks.  The first two cases the 
Supreme Court addressed involved the retroactivity of the statute—
specifically, whether the CRA applied to cases that were pending at 
the time of enactment.55  In both cases, the Court held that the CRA 
 
White—and when Justice Souter replaced Justice Brennan in 1990, he was 
more conservative but drifted consistently to the left thereafter. 
 52. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 53. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–307 (2006). 
 54. For example, I have excluded Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 
U.S. 105, 109 (2001) (interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act’s exemption for 
employment of transportation workers), but included EEOC v. Waffle House, 
Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 282 (2002) (holding that an agreement between employer 
and employee to arbitrate employment-related disputes does not bar the EEOC 
from seeking victim-related damages) and Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane 
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991) (upholding compulsory arbitration agreement for 
claims arising under the ADEA). 
 55. See Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 300 (1994) (holding 
that § 1981 does not apply retroactively); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 
W07_SELMI 4/15/2011  11:24:08 AM 
 
did not apply retroactively but instead only applied to controversies 
that arose after it was passed.56  This effectively delayed 
implementation for several years.  Notably, however, both decisions 
were written by Justice Stevens with Justice Blackmun as the lone 
dissenter, and there was substantial support for the Court’s decision 
both in the legislative history, which was purposefully left 
unresolved, and in the body of law that had developed regarding the 
retroactive application of legislation.57  The Court also decided the 
controversial St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks case after the CRA 
was passed, but the case itself had little to do with the statute even 
though the Court’s decision made it more difficult for plaintiffs to 
prevail in certain cases.58  Yet if we view Hicks as part of the post-
CRA history, the Court’s treatment is consistent with the pattern we 
observe in other cases—namely, that the most significant cases 
remain solidly in the defendants’ camp. 
After Hicks, the Court heard a series of cases in which plaintiffs 
prevailed, often through unanimous decisions.  In Appendix A, I 
provide a list of the cases decided since the CRA was passed, noting 
the party that prevailed, the year the case was decided, and the 
Supreme Court vote breakdown.  The results are revealing: the 
Supreme Court decided forty-three cases in connection with Title 
VII, the ADEA, and § 1981, and in twenty-nine, or 67.4%, of those 
decisions found in favor of the plaintiffs.  The defendants prevailed 
in thirteen, or 30.2%, of the cases.59  Of the forty-three decisions, 
twenty were unanimous, 46.5% of the total, and, remarkably, 
eighteen of the unanimous decisions were in favor of plaintiffs.  
Indeed, nearly two thirds (62.1%) of the decisions favoring plaintiffs 
were unanimous.60 
 
244, 247 (1994) (holding that amendments to Title VII do not apply 
retroactively). 
 56. Rivers, 511 U.S. at 300; Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 247. 
 57. These cases resonated personally with me since I had spent a 
significant amount of time arguing that the CRA did apply retroactively and 
was the lead appellate counsel on a case in which the argument was successful 
(a case in which I prevailed over one of my now colleagues).  See Estate of 
Reynolds v. Martin, 985 F.2d 470, 471 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 58. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510–11 (1993) (holding 
that proof of pretext may, but need not, lead to a finding of discrimination).  The 
effects of the Hicks case were muted by the introduction of jury trials as part of 
the CRA.  Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102(c), 105 Stat. 1071, 
1072.  The Court’s holding in Hicks has less relevance to a jury than to a judge, 
and has been particularly important at the summary judgment stage. 
 59. One of the cases was functionally a tie, as neither party’s position was 
adopted.  See Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 387–88 
(2008) (holding that so-called me-too evidence was subject to general evidence 
standards of relevancy rather than to any automatic rule). 
 60. See Table 1, infra. 
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TABLE 1: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES DECIDED 1993–2010 
 
Decision Plaintiff Defendant 
Prevail 29 13 
Unanimous 18 2 
5–4 1 5 
 
The high number of unanimous decisions in favor of plaintiffs 
offers a sharp contrast to the Court’s decisions rendered prior to the 
CRA.  During the period 1986–1989, there were five unanimous 
decisions and all but one had a significant concurring opinion 
supporting a more limited approach.61  Interestingly, none of the 
unanimous decisions were issued during 1989, when the Court was 
most active in limiting the scope of Title VII.62  In terms of 
substance, only one of the unanimous cases involved race 
discrimination, while three involved important issues relating to sex 
discrimination.  In contrast, the cases that most clearly prompted 
the CRA—Patterson, Wilks, and, to an extent, Wards Cove—all 
involved issues of race discrimination, as was true for most of the 
controversial affirmative action cases that arose during this time 
period.63 
 
 61. For a breakdown of the decisions, see Table 2, infra.  The only decision 
without some qualification was St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraj, 481 US. 604, 
613 (1987), which defined § 1981 to include national origin claims.  The other 
cases all had some limitations.  See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 
U.S. 272, 272–73 (1987) (holding, in an opinion by a fractured Court, that a 
leave policy that offered preferential treatment for women and exceeded the 
federal standards for pregnancy nondiscrimination was permissible); Bazemore 
v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400, 407–10 (1986) (handing down a unanimous 
decision on the relevance of regression analysis but a split decision on the 
public-accommodations provision); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 
66, 72 (1986) (handing down a unanimous decision on the permissibility of the 
hostile-work-environment theory but withholding judgment on the scope of 
liability). 
 62. See Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 197, 212–13 
(1991) (analyzing a fetal-protection policy as facially discriminatory with a 
concurring opinion suggesting that the possibility of third-party lawsuits might 
constitute adequate justification for the policy); Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 
182, 189 (1990) (permitting the EEOC to obtain information relating to a tenure 
decision). 
 63. Only one of the cases overturned or modified by the CRA substantively 
involved sex discrimination.  Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989), 
superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 112, 105 
Stat. 1071, 1078–79. 
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Table 2: Employment Discrimination Cases Decided 1987–1991 
 
Decision Plaintiff Defendant 
Prevail 10 12 
Unanimous 5 0 
5–4 1 3 
6–3 2 4 
 
The substantial rise in unanimous decisions not only represents 
a change in course for the Supreme Court but also highlights an 
important issue embedded in these cases—namely, just how 
conservative some of the lower courts have become.  Perhaps more 
accurately, the cases indicate how much more conservative some of 
the lower courts are compared to what is generally viewed as a very 
conservative Supreme Court.  While it is difficult to draw any 
conclusions based on this small sample, it is worth noting that of the 
eighteen unanimous decisions, eleven originated from the Fourth, 
Fifth, and Sixth Circuits, with the Sixth leading the way with five 
unanimous reversals.  Only one of the unanimous decisions was an 
outright affirmance, and that was the mixed-motives case Desert 
Palace, Inc. v. Costa,64 which arose out of the Ninth Circuit, often 
considered the most liberal appellate court.  Some of the cases 
involved appellate decisions that were clearly outliers and were 
essentially summarily reversed.  For example, the Fourth Circuit 
held that to establish a prima facie age discrimination claim, an 
individual had to demonstrate that she had been replaced by 
someone outside of the protected class, a holding that had no 
support in the statutory language and that the Supreme Court 
reversed in a seven-paragraph opinion.65  The same court also held 
that former employees could not bring Title VII claims, excising 
from the statute anyone who was no longer employed.66  This latter 
case had some resemblance to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Patterson—as both cases involved the scope of the statute—and 
suggests that the Supreme Court may have taken seriously 
Congress’s directive to interpret the statutes consistently with their 
underlying purposes. 
Perhaps the most interesting of the unanimous decisions 
reversing a hostile lower court was a case that involved racial 
epithets.  In Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals had held that the use of “boy,” when directed at an African 
American man, was not evidence of discriminatory intent unless it 
 
 64. 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
 65. See O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (1996), rev’g 
56 F.3d 542 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 66. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 70 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc), 
rev’d, 519 U.S. 337 (1997). 
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was qualified by a racial term such as “black.”67  In a per curiam 
rebuke, the Supreme Court rejected the need for the racial qualifier, 
noting that whether the term was evidence of discrimination should 
be considered within its context and in conjunction with additional 
evidence the plaintiff produced.68  In the same case, the Court also 
rejected the appellate court’s standard—that pretext could only be 
established by comparison to the employer’s treatment of others to 
the extent the “disparity in qualifications is so apparent as virtually 
to jump off the page and slap you in the face.”69  Despite the 
Supreme Court’s sound rejection, the Eleventh Circuit recently 
reaffirmed a dismissal of the case, albeit under slightly different 
legal standards.70 
Another noteworthy aspect of the unanimous cases is that most 
of the cases were of minor significance.  Several had to do with 
procedural issues that had not been resolved in the thirty-year 
history of Title VII, such as the requirements for verifying a 
complaint and the method for counting employees to meet the 
statutory coverage requirement.71  The Supreme Court decided only 
two cases during the Wards Cove era that presented similar 
interpretive questions,72 and in these and other cases, the Court has 
recently taken a pragmatic rather than literal linguistic approach.  
This was true in the Court’s definition of “employee” and its 
determination that the number of employees is not a jurisdictional 
issue, even though there were substantial arguments in support of 
the other side on both issues.73  In the earlier era, it seems quite 
likely that the Court would have ruled differently, or, more likely, 
allowed the lower court decisions to stand without review.74 
 
 67. See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 129 F. App’x 529, 533 (11th Cir. 2005), 
rev’d, 546 U.S. 454 (2006). 
 68. See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456 (2006). 
 69. Id. at 456–57 (quoting Ash, 129 F. App’x at 533 (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 70. See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 392 F. App’x 817 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 71. See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006) (determining that 
employee numerosity is not a jurisdictional issue); Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 
535 U.S. 106 (2002) (upholding an EEOC regulation allowing for post-charge 
verification); Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 212 (1997) 
(adopting the payroll method for counting employees). 
 72. See Stevens v. Dep’t of Treasury, 500 U.S. 1, 6 (1991) (requiring an 
employee to file a notice of intent to sue with the EEOC within 180 days of the 
discriminatory act and at least 30 days before filing suit); Martin v. Wilks, 490 
U.S. 755, 764 (1989) (permitting challenges to consent decrees by employees not 
present at the time the decree was entered), superseded by statute, Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 108, 105 Stat. 1071, 1076–77. 
 73. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 510–15. 
 74. If the Court were so inclined, it could have reached a different 
conclusion in Arbaugh, which makes its unanimity all the more surprising.  
Given that Title VII only applies to employers with fifteen or more employees, 
permitting the statute to apply to a smaller employer, as appeared to be the 
case in Arbaugh, seems to be a stretch.  But the question the Court was likely 
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Not all of the unanimous cases have turned on minor issues.  
The Court held that Title VII prohibits same-sex harassment,75 an 
issue that had caused considerable havoc in the lower courts; tossed 
aside any remnant of the pretext-plus issue;76 and in two cases, 
crafted quite liberal principles of law relating to retaliation claims.77  
Indeed, if there has been any major and surprising turn of events, it 
has been the Supreme Court’s protective approach to retaliation 
claims.  Plaintiffs have prevailed in all five retaliation claims the 
Court has considered, and the Court has adopted an expansive 
interpretation of the statute in each case.  In one of the cases, the 
Court had to identify a retaliation claim when the statute was 
arguably silent or at best ambiguous on the issue.78  These cases 
have helped spark a sharp rise in retaliation claims, but despite that 
increase, the Court has not sought to cut back on its broad 
interpretations, and it is difficult to see the Court as anything other 
than genuinely protective of retaliation claims.79 
 
asking itself is why this issue had not been raised earlier, and it probably 
relented in the face of a completed trial.  A similar pragmatic result was 
reached in a case involving whether an EEOC intake form can constitute a 
charge of discrimination.  See Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 
402–03 (2008).  The Court affirmed an EEOC regulation permitting this 
scenario, given that a different conclusion likely would have simply meant that 
the person would have filed a charge much later to avoid penalizing the plaintiff 
for the way the EEOC had handled the case.  Id. at 406–07. 
 75. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998) 
(permitting same-sex harassment claims). 
 76. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148–49 
(2000) (abrogating pretext-plus decisions by the lower courts). 
 77. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 129 S. Ct. 
846, 849 (2009) (holding that an individual who participates in an internal 
proceeding can proceed on a retaliation claim); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. 
Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67–68 (2006) (establishing a standard for a 
retaliation claim when an employee would be discouraged from filing a claim). 
 78. In Gomez-Perez v. Potter, the Court read into the ADEA a retaliation 
provision in an opinion by Justice Alito that drew dissents from Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas.  Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 
477–79 (2008).  This case can likewise be seen as a purely pragmatic decision, 
as there was little question that Congress would have inserted the standard 
retaliation provision into the statute since this appeared to be little more than a 
drafting error.  See also Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 849; CBOCS W., Inc. v. 
Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 445 (2008) (implying a retaliation cause of action in § 
1981); Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68.  The Burlington Northern case provides an 
example of just how protective the Court has been, as the plaintiff prevailed in 
the lower court on a stricter standard than the Supreme Court adopted.  For a 
discussion of the cases, see Michael Zimmer, A Pro-Employee Supreme Court?  
The Retaliation Decisions, 60 S.C. L. REV. 917, 917 n.2, 919–23 (2009). 
 79. Retaliation claims filed with the EEOC have increased from 21,613 in 
Fiscal Year 2000 to 33,613 in Fiscal Year 2009.  Charge Statistics, U.S. EEOC, 
http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Apr. 8, 
2011).  This term the Court held that certain third-party retaliation claims 
could be pursued under Title VII; in that particular case, the employer 
appeared to retaliate against the employee’s fiancée.  See Thompson v. N. Am. 
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The plaintiff-friendly cases demonstrate that the Supreme 
Court has moved in a direction that has been more protective of 
victims of discrimination, but there is an important countertrend 
that offers a clear balance and also suggests that the Court may be 
playing a sophisticated political game.  In the most significant 
cases—including the sole employment case to touch on questions 
relating to affirmative action80—the defendants continue to prevail, 
and often by five-to-four majorities.  In these cases, the Court 
continues to impose its preferences, but now does so while also 
issuing a series of pro-plaintiff decisions, most of which likely do not 
implicate clear preferences of the Court.  There have been five 
decisions in favor of defendants by a five-to-four margin, and at least 
four of the cases are among the most significant decided since the 
CRA.81  As noted previously, the Supreme Court began the post-CRA 
era with a five-to-four decision in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 
in which it held that proof of pretext leads to a permissive inference 
of discrimination rather than the mandatory presumption advocated 
by the plaintiffs and adopted by the lower court.82  That decision also 
kept alive the damaging pretext-plus theory, though only by 
disingenuous lower court interpretations, which the Supreme Court 
abrogated nearly a decade later.83 
More recently, the Supreme Court has issued several 
controversial decisions favoring defendants.  In Ricci v. DeStefano, 
the conservative majority of the Court invalidated an employer’s 
voluntary efforts to remedy the adverse impact of several promotion 
tests it had administered.84  Reverting to its Wards Cove days, the 
Court deemed the tests valid even though the tests had not been 
subject to any legal scrutiny and despite strong arguments that the 
tests could not be validated under existing law.85  The Ricci case has 
 
Stainless, L.P., 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011).  I should note that I did not include 
Thompson in the statistical count, given that, as I write this, the term is not yet 
completed and including only some of the cases might appear misleading.  One 
might define Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001), as a 
loss for plaintiffs on a retaliation claim, but that case seems to be more about 
pleading than about retaliation and was a unanimous per curiam decision.  Id. 
at 271, 274. 
 80. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2663–64 (2009). 
 81. See Table 3, infra. 
 82. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 523–24 (1993). 
 83. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148–49 
(2000). 
 84. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2664. 
 85. See id. at 2678 (“There is no genuine dispute that the examinations 
were job-related and consistent with business necessity”).  This statement 
ignored the numerous objections that had been raised about the test, including 
its limited utility for assessing skills relevant to higher-level positions and its 
use as a rank-order device.  Id. at 2707 n.16.  It is my own sense that the tests 
at issue in Ricci would have been very difficult to justify under existing 
validation guidelines.  The case has been the subject of extensive critical 
commentary.  See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading 
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drawn considerable attention and harkens back to the assault on 
affirmative action from the 1980s, as the Court appeared to view the 
city’s remedial action as akin to instituting racial preferences for the 
minority firefighters.86  The following term, the Court also held that 
the mixed-motives theory, often seen as a boon to plaintiffs, was not 
available under the ADEA, even though the language at issue in the 
ADEA was quite similar to the language in Title VII that permits 
such claims.87  The difference in results between cases decided under 
Title VII and the ADEA may be a sign that statutory language can, 
in fact, restrain the Court.  Although the Court announced a liberal 
standard for Title VII claims based on language from the CRA, that 
language did not apply to the ADEA, leaving the Court free to 
implement its preference on age claims. 









The other noteworthy five-to-four decision reveals that the 
Court can still overplay its hand.  In the only employment 
discrimination case to receive more attention than Ricci, the 
Supreme Court held that Lilly Ledbetter had waited too long to file 
her wage discrimination claim.88  There were, to be sure, some 
pragmatic aspects to the case that led the Court to side with the 
employer.  However, in doing so, the Court imposed a restrictive 
standard that would have likely foreclosed most wage 
discrimination claims since it can often take employees years to 
learn that pay raises were issued in a discriminatory fashion.  In her 
dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg called on Congress to act,89 and 
it quickly did so.  Just over a year after the decision was issued, the 
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act (“Fair Pay Act”) became the first bill 
President Barack Obama signed into law, thus reversing the 
 
Ricci: Whitening Discrimination, Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73 
(2010). 
 86. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677.  See generally Helen Norton, The Supreme 
Court’s Post-Racial Turn Towards a Zero-Sum Understanding of Equality, 52 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 197 (2010); Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate 
Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341 (2010). 
 87. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009). 
 88. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 621 (2007), 
superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 
123 Stat. 5. 
 89. Id. at 661 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks  
 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 
 Kentucky Retirement Systems v. EEOC 
 Ricci v. DeStefano 
 Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. 
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Supreme Court’s decision and likely expanding the statute of 
limitations beyond what had existed in most of the lower courts.90  
The case, and the subsequent Fair Pay Act, also drew attention to 
the issue of pay equity in a way the Court likely did not intend, and 
there is little question that to the extent the Court was seeking to 
insulate employers from wage discrimination claims, its Ledbetter 
decision ultimately had the opposite effect.91  Nevertheless, the 
unintended consequences may prove more theoretical than real, as 
to date there has not been any significant increase in wage claims, 
and a bill to address pay equity issues has failed to gain traction.92 
I should also note that rather than overplaying its hand, the 
Supreme Court may have misjudged future election results.  The 
Ledbetter decision was issued toward the end of the Bush presidency 
but before the Democrats took over the presidency and both houses 
of Congress.  It is certainly possible that had the decision been 
issued the following year, the Court may have sought a more 
moderate path, although its decision in the Ricci case may suggest 
otherwise.  There is, however, an important distinction between 
those two cases: Ledbetter was purely a matter of statutory 
interpretation and relatively easy to overturn, while Ricci 
represented an amalgam of interpretations of past Supreme Court 
precedent with overlays of constitutional considerations.  The Ricci 
case also involved race, whereas Ledbetter presented a more 
appealing sex discrimination claim that was ripe for congressional 
review. 
In addition to the unanimous decisions for plaintiffs and the 
five-to-four decisions for defendants, there was a series of cases 
decided by various margins and also a set of cases in which it was 
difficult to determine what party would ultimately come out ahead.  
These latter cases included three in which the Court provided a 
 
 90. See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).  The Act 
amends Title VII’s filing requirement for compensation cases so that an 
employment practice occurs “when a discriminatory compensation decision or 
other practice is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to a 
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, or when an individual is 
affected by application of a discriminatory compensation decision or other 
practice, including each time wages, benefits or other compensation is paid.”  42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A).  That standard is potentially broader than any 
standard that had existed in the lower courts. 
 91. Not only was the Act amended to overturn Ledbetter, but also another 
bill has been introduced to address pay equity issues.  See Paycheck Fairness 
Act, S. 182, 111th Cong. (2009); Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 12, 111th Cong. 
(2009). 
 92. The other five-to-four decision was a complicated age discrimination 
case in which the defendant prevailed, but it would be difficult to characterize 
the case as significantly disadvantaging older employees because the plan at 
issue was unusual and the particular case was enmeshed in peculiar facts.  See 
Ky. Ret. Sys. v. EEOC, 554 U.S. 135, 143–47 (2008). 
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legal standard that was generally protective of plaintiff interests, 
and then carved out an affirmative defense to encourage employers 
to take precautionary measures.93  The Court first took this step in a 
pair of sexual harassment cases in which it crafted an affirmative 
defense out of thin air—but a defense that also seemed consistent 
with the purpose behind the CRA, which is to prevent rather than 
remedy harassment.94  What is perhaps most revealing is that 
although the language of the affirmative defense should make it 
difficult for employers to proceed, lower courts have frequently 
construed the defense more broadly so as to deny plaintiffs relief.95  
In another case—this one unanimous—the Supreme Court resolved 
a long-standing split in the circuits by holding that the age 
discrimination statute permitted disparate impact claims, while 
creating a very loose standard for employers to justify their 
practices.96 
Viewed in their entirety, the cases decided after 1991 reveal a 
decidedly different Supreme Court from the one that prompted 
passage of the CRA.  The current Court seems more moderate and 
less hostile to employment discrimination plaintiffs and remarkably 
protective of the right to be free from retaliation, but at the same 
time continues to implement its own preferences when it matters 
the most.  As a matter of positive political theory, the Court has 
responded not with timidity but in a strategically sophisticated 
fashion, and most of its decisions have remained in force.  In other 
words, the CRA provided a meaningful but not total restraint on the 
 
 93. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 545–46 (1999) (adopting 
an affirmative defense in connection with a punitive damages claim); 
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (adopting an 
affirmative defense in sexual harassment cases); Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807–08 (1998) (same). 
 94. As best I have been able to determine, the affirmative defense had not 
previously been adopted by any court in a sexual harassment case, and it was 
not presented in any of the briefs filed in the case.  See generally Elizabeth M. 
Brama, Note, The Changing Burden of Employer Liability for Workplace 
Discrimination, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1481 (1999) (discussing prior case law).  This 
gives credence to Justice Thomas’s claim in dissent that the defense was made 
up out of “whole cloth.”  See Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 771 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
 95. An early assessment demonstrated that lower courts were interpreting 
the affirmative defense so that employers who acted appropriately were 
generally immunized from liability, even if the defense did not technically 
apply.  See David Sherwyn et al., Don’t Train Your Employees and Cancel Your 
“1-800” Harassment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction of the 
Flaws in the Affirmative Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1265, 1266, 1294 (2001). 
 96. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 232, 239 (2005).  In Smith, 
the Supreme Court adopted a “reasonableness” standard based loosely on the 
portion of the Wards Cove decision that had been overruled by the CRA; much 
like in the Ricci case, the Court went on to uphold the City’s practice even 
though the reasonableness of the practice had not been briefed or argued.  Id. at 
240–41. 
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Court’s impulses. 
III. THE 1991 ACT AND THE LOWER COURTS 
Although the CRA appears to have restrained the Supreme 
Court, it has had significantly less force in the lower courts.  While I 
will not go into great detail to demonstrate the hostility to 
employment discrimination claims at the appellate level, I will 
highlight three different indicators.  One has already been 
discussed, and that is the number of cases in which the Supreme 
Court unanimously reversed lower courts.  In addition, appellate 
courts have created a number of legal doctrines that make it more 
difficult for plaintiffs to prove their cases.  Many of the doctrines are 
evidentiary in nature, but all of them make it more, rather than 
less, difficult for plaintiffs to prevail.  These doctrines include the 
creation of a fourth element of the prima facie case that requires 
plaintiffs (in some circuits) to prove that there is a similarly situated 
individual who was treated differently, with strict requirements 
governing who will satisfy the requirement; the stray remarks 
doctrine; and the same actor inference.97  Equally important, no 
evidentiary rule or legal doctrine has arisen that favors plaintiffs, 
with the possible exception of some of the emerging case law 
regarding mixed-motives claims.98 
Perhaps the strongest indicator of the difficulty plaintiffs face in 
lower courts is revealed by the many studies that have documented 
low success rates both at trial and on appeal.  In her Symposium 
contribution, Professor Wendy Parker surveys the studies,99 and I 
will only add a brief summary of my own.  The various studies are 
all consistent in their findings—more employment discrimination 
cases go to trial than do other kinds of cases, but plaintiffs typically 
have a lower success rate.  Plaintiffs succeed in somewhere between 
35–40% of their cases tried before a jury, with a significantly lower 
success rate before a judge.100  Even though most cases are now tried 
 
 97. These doctrines are all discussed in DIANNE AVERY ET AL., EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAW 124–32 (8th ed. 2010). 
 98. See, e.g., Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 
2004) (adopting a modified standard for summary judgment purposes).  
Although the mixed-motives theory has drawn considerable interest among 
academics, and can be a useful theory at the summary judgment stage, the 
limited remedies available under the theory render it less useful at trial. 
 99. See generally Wendy Parker, Juries, Race, and Gender: A Story of 
Today’s Inequality, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 185, 192–99 (2011). 
 100. Id. at 195–96.  In charting the win rates for plaintiffs from 1990–2001, 
Professors Laura Beth Nielson and Robert L. Nelson demonstrated a success 
rate that ranged from a low of 35.8% (1996) to a high of 43.6% (1992), with an 
average of 40%.  See Laura Beth Nielson & Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized?: 
An Empirical Analysis of Employment Discrimination Litigation as a Claiming 
System, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 663, 699 tbl.4.A.  The success rates in bench trials 
were typically one half that of those in cases tried to juries, with the notable 
exception of 2001, when plaintiffs prevailed in one third of their bench trials.  
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before juries, this latter finding is important because judges handle 
the pre- and post-trial motions, and plaintiffs tend to have a low 
success rate in defending summary judgment motions.101  The data 
also demonstrate that employment discrimination plaintiffs fare 
worse than other civil plaintiffs both at trial and on appeal.102 
It might be that the lower success rates reflect weaker cases, 
but it is not at all clear why this might be so.  There is no clear 
reason why employees would file weaker cases, particularly given 
the filtering process that requires individuals to first proceed 
through the federal EEOC or the state analogue.103  While there may 
be a higher number of pro se plaintiffs, the absolute number 
remains very small, and very few ever get to trial.104  The settlement 
values are also typically modest,105 so these cases should not be 
particularly attractive to profit-motivated attorneys, though the 
availability of attorney’s fees might be an additional incentive.  
Nevertheless, if the monetary value is not the inducement, the 
prospect of success surely should be, and again, unless the cases 
were worth significantly more, attorneys should have the same 
incentives to bring strong employment discrimination claims as they 
would to bring other civil cases.106  It also strikes me as problematic 
to assume it is the cases rather than the judges that drive the 
disparate results—it seems to me the burden should be on 
explaining what those differences might be rather than simply 
suggesting employment discrimination cases are less meritorious.  
Indeed, the “blame the cases” mentality—which arises in most 
presentations of the data—mirrors the judicial hostility to 
 
Id. 
 101. The difficulty plaintiffs encounter on summary judgment has been well 
and repeatedly documented.  For two recent analyses, see Elizabeth M. 
Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The 
Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 
U. PA. L. REV. 517 (2010), and Elizabeth Schneider, The Dangers of Summary 
Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705 (2007). 
 102. See Kevin Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment 
Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 429, 
455 fig.12 (2004).  The difference varies, but for both 1995 and 2001, plaintiffs 
had a 5% differential at trial, with similar differences on appeal.  Id. at 441 
fig.7. 
 103. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006); Laura Beth 
Nielsen et al., Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization?  Employment 
Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL 
L. STUD. 175, 177 (2010). 
 104. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 102, at 434 tbl.1, 440. 
 105. Nielsen et al., supra note 103, at 188. 
 106. I have commented on these issues previously.  See Michael Selmi, Why 
Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Difficult to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 
570 (2001).  For an interesting alternative explanation for appellate court 
hostility that focuses on judicial workload, see Lee Reeves, Pragmatism over 
Politics: Recent Trends in Lower Court Employment Discrimination 
Jurisprudence, 73 MO. L. REV. 481, 512–22 (2008). 
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employment discrimination cases. 
Although it may come as a surprise to some that in the context 
of employment discrimination cases the lower courts now appear to 
be more conservative than the Supreme Court, this is less of a 
surprise within the positive political theory framework.  
Congressional action is almost always aimed at the Supreme Court 
rather than lower courts, and as a result, Congress poses less of a 
threat to the lower courts.  Instead, the Supreme Court plays the 
primary restraining role on the appellate courts, and it may be that 
the chance of review and reversal is so low as to pose only a limited 
constraint.  At the same time, the prospect of congressional reversal 
also seems quite low, and it is not clear why one would pose a 
greater restraint than the other.  It may be that the difference lies 
in the assumptions behind the process: Supreme Court review is a 
normal part of the appellate process, whereas congressional action is 
an extraordinary and public process that typically is directed at 
cases of greater magnitude. 
Whatever the reason, the problem for plaintiffs pursuing 
employment discrimination claims lies primarily in the lower courts 
rather than in the Supreme Court; this also makes the prospect for 
meaningful change more complicated since congressional action is 
less likely to reshape judicial approaches in the appellate courts.  
The Supreme Court might be able to prompt change, but, outside of 
a handful of aberrational cases, that does not seem to be the Court’s 
interest.  I think there is little question that the current Supreme 
Court remains fundamentally conservative and is not likely to have 
a preference for greater plaintiff success in the lower courts. 
CONCLUSION 
The CRA not only reversed a series of decisions but also 
prompted the Supreme Court to change its interpretive position.  
Plaintiffs have fared considerably better in the last two decades 
than they did in the period immediately preceding the passage of 
the CRA.  But the Supreme Court has clearly not entirely relented, 
as it continues to reach conservative results in the cases in which it 
appears to have the strongest preferences.  Close decisions continue 
to trend for defendants without much variation, whereas the 
decisions that side with plaintiffs are now most commonly 
unanimous, and often short, decisions.  Yet, as noted, the real 
obstacles for plaintiffs have simply moved to the appellate courts, in 
which plaintiffs now continually face hostile forums, ones that the 
Supreme Court is generally willing to accept and that avoid the 
glare of Congress.  So while the Supreme Court has become a more 
favorable forum for employment discrimination plaintiffs, conditions 
on the whole have not significantly improved. 
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